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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the relationship between agency costs, ownership structure and corporate 
governance mechanisms in Ghana for the study period 2000-2009. Our results show that smaller 
board size and the presence of audit and remuneration committees decrease agency costs. We 
also find that higher managerial and institutional ownership reduces agency costs. However, 
duality and the proportion of non-executive directors on the board have no effect on agency 
costs, suggesting that not all board structure governance mechanisms are effective in mitigating 
agency costs.  Interestingly, the non-board structure code recommendations such as improved 
shareholder voting rights, the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards and 
auditor quality have also reduced agency costs. Overall, we find that the introduction of the 
Ghanaian Code played significant role in reducing agency costs. 
 
Keywords: Agency costs, corporate governance, ownership structure, Ghana 
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1. Introduction 
 Agency costs refer to the monitoring, bonding and residual loss that may be incurred by 
shareholders in an agency relationship. Agency costs arise because of the separation of 
ownership and control and the misalignment of the interests of managers and shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen, 1986). The separation of ownership and control leads to 
non-zero agency costs (Ang et al, 2000) and these costs might be significantly higher in 
countries with weak legal systems and poor investor protection (Gurgler et al, 2003). Agency 
costs are not only limited to the incidence of separation of ownership and control (Berle and 
Means, 1932) but are also present between controlling shareholders and other investors (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Fan et al, 2002) if the controlling shareholders become part of management or 
have significant influence on management decision making. From the agency theory perspective, 
strong corporate governance plays an important role in protecting shareholders in general, and 
minority interests in particular and, hence, should result in lower agency costs.  
Agency theory identifies a range of governance mechanisms that are designed to realign 
the interests of managers and shareholders in order to reduce agency costs. Many countries, for 
example, the UK, Germany, Australia and South Africa have promoted good governance through 
the introduction of codes of best practice. In addition, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development has also issued a code that identifies desirable governance 
characteristics. These codes recommend that firms adopt internal governance mechanisms such 
as non-executive directors’ representation on the board, the separation of the posts of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and chairman and the setting up of committees to deal with a range of 
issues such as auditing and remuneration.  
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The Ghanaian corporate governance code of best practice (henceforth the Ghanaian 
Code) was introduced by the Security and Exchange Commission Ghana in 2003, with its 
principles applying to all corporate bodies approved or licensed as stock exchanges, dealers and 
investment advisers. In particular, the Code identified governance structures that were perceived 
to promote effective corporate governance and recommended that they should be adopted. This 
is similar to the approach adopted in the UK and South Africa in the Cadbury Report (1992) and 
King Report I (1994) respectively and is based on a comply or explain philosophy. The Ghanaian 
Code therefore requires that, in their annual reports, companies disclose their compliance with 
the code or provide an explanation for any non-compliance. 
While the extant research has extensively focused on the governance-performance 
relationship (i.e. Dalton et al 1998; Weir et al, 2002; Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Coles et al, 
2008; Wintoki et al, 2012; Owusu and Weir, 2016), relatively few studies dealing with either 
developed or emerging economies have attempted either to directly measure agency costs or to 
analyse the factors that influence them.  Studies that have investigated agency costs include Ang 
et al (2000); Singh and Davidson (2003) for the US; Fleming et al (2005) for the Australia; 
McKnight and Weir (2009), Florackis and Ozkan (2009) for the UK; Wang et al (2011) and 
Mustapha and Che Ahmad (2011) for China and Malaysia. However, none of these investigated 
the period before and after the introduction of their country-specific code or whether the non-
board structure governance variables recommended within these corporate governance codes 
were also important factors in reducing agency costs.  
We therefore analyse how far compliance with the individual governance mechanisms of 
the Ghanaian Code has affected agency costs. In addition, if firms voluntarily adopt the 
recommendations of the code in such a volatile environment, investors’ interests are more likely 
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to be protected and this might lead to increased share ownership with the consequential effect on 
ownership structures across Ghanaian firms. We therefore argue that increased managerial and 
institutional ownership following the introduction of the Ghanaian Code might reduce agency 
costs relative to the pre-code period. This study is important because Ghana, relative to the other 
country-specific studies, is an emerging African country characterised by weak legal systems, 
poor investor protection and poor economic management (Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 2002, 
Gurgler et al, 2003; Fisher, 2011). Given that corporate governance matters more in countries 
with weak legal systems and poor investor protection (Klapper and Love, 2004), we argue that 
the introduction of the Ghanaian Code in 2003 should have mitigated any agency conflicts and 
so have led to lower agency costs.  
Using a sample of Ghanaian listed firms covering the period 2000 to 2009 and a panel 
data analytical framework, our results show that, after controlling for endogeneity, smaller board 
size decreases agency costs measured by sale-to-assets ratio. We also find evidence to suggest 
that the presence of audit and remuneration committees decrease agency costs measured by 
sales-to-assets ratio. However, we find that neither duality nor the proportion of non-executive 
directors affects agency costs. We also find that increased managerial and institutional ownership 
mitigates agency costs. Further, we find evidence to suggest that the introduction of the 
Ghanaian Code played a significant role in reducing agency costs relative to the pre-code 
adoption period. Finally, we report that non-board structure variables recommended by the 
Ghanaian Code, for example, shareholder activism, audit quality and the adoption of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have also been effective in reducing agency 
costs.   
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Our paper makes a number of contributions to the existing literature. First, although the 
agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms have been subject to 
much analysis, for example, Ang et al (2000); McKnight and Weir (2009); Mustapha and Che 
Ahmad (2011), to date no study has investigated agency costs in an emerging African economy 
like Ghana and therefore this study helps to fill this gap in the literature. Second, prior studies 
have analysed the link between agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance 
mechanisms after the introduction of a code, we show that the introduction of the Ghanaian Code 
has brought about ownership and corporate governance changes that have reduced agency costs 
relative to the pre-code period. Third, our evidence not only complements Singh and Davidson 
(2003), Fleming et al (2005), Mustapha and Che Ahmad (2011) who show that firms with 
greater managerial ownership experience lower agency costs, we provide further evidence to 
suggest that the relationship is more pronounced after the introduction of a corporate governance 
code of best practices relative to pre-code period. Finally, we provide new evidence to suggest 
that non-board structure variables such as shareholder activism, audit quality and the adoption of 
IFRS as recommended by the Ghanaian code are effective in reducing agency costs. These 
results highlight the importance of looking beyond board structure mechanisms, something 
which tends to be ignored in other studies.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and sets out 
a number of hypotheses. Section 3 presents data sources, variable measurement and the empirical 
models. Section 4 provides the results and discussion whilst Section 5 conclusions the paper.  
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2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Theoretical overview 
The theoretical context for the analysis is the agency model which suggests a range of 
corporate governance mechanisms that, if adopted, should improve the effectiveness of a firm’s 
governance by alleviating the agency conflicts. Given that many countries have introduced 
governance codes, we expect that the recommendations within these codes will result in a better 
governance system and hence should reduce agency costs as a consequence of more effective 
monitoring and a better quality of advice.  
Consistent with the agency model, the 2003 Ghanaian Code introduced corporate 
governance guidelines with which Ghanaian firms were encouraged to comply. The key board-
related provisions in the code refer to the separating the posts of the CEO and the Chairman of 
the board of directors; limiting the board size to between eight and 16 directors; having at least 
one-third of the total membership of the board to be independent directors; and the establishment 
of separate board committees. These committees are the audit committee responsible for the 
protection of shareholder interests in relation to financial reporting and internal controls, and the 
remuneration committee responsible for designing appropriate remuneration packages that 
promote the long-term success of the business. Other provisions call for improvement of the 
relationship between shareholders and managers as well as the provisions on financial affairs, 
auditing and disclosure practices. The underlying expectation is that compliance will reduce 
agency conflicts and therefore reduce agency costs. 
Extant research in Ghana demonstrates that significant progress has been made in relation 
to Ghanaian listed firms’ governance practices since the introduction of the Ghanaian Code in 
2003. For example, Owusu and Weir (2013) find evidence to suggest that the standard of 
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corporate governance across companies has improved since the introduction of the Ghanaian 
Code. This is supported by Owusu and Weir (2016) who constructed a corporate governance 
index measuring the extent of overall compliance with the Ghanaian Code and show that the 
overall compliance with the Code’s recommendations increased significantly after its 
introduction. However, Owusu and Weir (2016) did not investigate the effectiveness of 
individual governance provisions recommended by the Ghanaian Code or whether the code 
affected ownership structures. 
   
2.2 Hypothesis development 
Agency theory suggests that a smaller board size is more effective than larger board size 
for performing their monitoring, controlling and decision making functions (Lipton and Lorch, 
1992; Jensen and Meckling 1976). For example, Lipton and Lorch (1992) argue that a board size 
of between eight and nine directors is optimal because the additional costs associated with slow 
decision-making are higher than the marginal benefits if the number of directors exceeds ten. 
Consistent with this, there is a considerable evidence showing that smaller boards have a positive 
effect on firm performance. For example, Yemarck (1996), Eisenberg et al, (1998), Singh and 
Davidson (2003), Bozec (2005) and Guest (2009) all show that smaller boards improve 
performance. Therefore, boards that are too big will have a negative impact on shareholder value 
implying that they increase agency costs.    
The Ghanaian Code recommends a board size to be in the range of eight to sixteen. Given 
the work of Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) who found the average board size of around 
eight to be positively associated with firm performance in Ghana, the first hypothesis is: 
 
9 
 
H1. The smaller the board size, the lower the agency costs.  
 
The second governance mechanism recommended by the Ghanaian Code relates to 
duality, the combining of the two most powerful board positions, the CEO and chairman. Duality 
is held to be undesirable because it adversely affects the ability of the board to effectively 
evaluate the CEO’s performance, and hence will increase agency costs.  
However, the empirical evidence relating to the impact of duality on performance is 
mixed. For example, Dalton et al (1998), Chen et al (2008), McKnight and Weir (2009) and 
Larcker et al (2011), find no support for the claim that duality harms performance. However, 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) find some evidence that duality is harmful to firm 
performance in Ghana in the period before the code was introduced. Consistent with the 
Ghanaian code, the second hypothesis is:    
 
H2. The separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman should lead to lower agency costs.  
 
The third governance mechanism recommended by the Ghanaian Code is for firms to 
have a balance of executive and non-executive directors with at least one third independent non-
executive directors. Agency theory argues that boards dominated by executive directors 
(insiders) are not accountable to shareholders (Fama, 1980) and therefore may lead to higher 
agency costs. Given that the non-executive directors on the board have different expertise and 
are appointed to monitor and advise the executive directors on behalf of the shareholders, their 
presence is expected to enhance the board decision-making process to help maximise shareholder 
value, particularly as they are concerned with their reputation in the external labour market 
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(Fama and Jensen 1983). Alternatively, non-executive directors are usually part time and may sit 
on several boards, all of which will adversely affect their ability to monitor the actions of the 
executive directors.  
In spite of the fact that all governance codes recommend that non-executive director 
presence is a good thing, the evidence surrounding their impact on performance is mixed. A 
number of studies have found a positive association between the proportion of non-executive 
directors representation on the board and firm performance (Cho and Kim, 2007; Coles et al, 
2008; Gupta and Fields, 2009). However, other studies suggest that the presence of outside 
directors on the board has no effect on firm performance (Daily and Dalton, 1992; Klein, 1998; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Kajola, 2008; Sanda et al, 2010; Wintoki et al, 2012). This is 
consistent with McKnight and Weir (2009) who find no evidence that non-executive director 
representation affects agency costs. 
In spite of the mixed evidence, and consistent with the Ghanaian Code recommendations, 
the third hypothesis is: 
 
H3. The larger the proportion of non-executive directors on the boards, the lower the agency 
costs.   
 
The fourth governance mechanism recommended by the Ghanaian Code is the 
establishment of board committees. Klein (1998) argues that these committees’ functions help to 
minimise agency costs because of managers’ timely release of unbiased accounting information 
to shareholders. Weir et al (2002) argue that the existence of board committees may improve 
corporate accountability, legitimacy and credibility. The setting up of committees therefore 
improves the effectiveness and efficiency of the board (Jiraporn et al, 2009).  
11 
 
Prior studies have found a positive relationship between board committees and firm 
performance (Wild 1994; Laing and Weir, 1999; Black and Kim, 2012). However, Vafeas (1999) 
finds that the adoption of board committees adds extra costs relating to management time, travel 
expenses and additional fees paid to the members of the committees. He concluded that board 
committees can have negative effect on firm performance, a finding supported by Bozec (2005) 
and Lam and Lee (2012). 
The main committees recommended by the Ghanaian Code are the audit and 
remuneration committees. For example, the audit committee functions of having frequent 
meetings with the firm’s internal and external auditors, reviewing its financial statements, 
facilitating the audit process and accounting control systems may be important in reducing 
agency costs. Similarly, ensuring that executive remuneration is linked to company performance 
will also reduce agency costs. Therefore, given the recommendations of the Ghanaian Code, the 
fourth hypothesis is:   
 
H4. The presence of audit and remuneration committees should reduce the agency costs.    
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that increased managerial ownership helps to align the 
interests of shareholders and managers by giving them a financial stake in the firm’s 
performance. Therefore as managerial ownership increases, agency costs will be reduced (Singh 
and Davidson, 2003; Fleming et al, 2005; McKnight and Weir, 2009; Mustapha and Che Ahmad, 
2011). In Ghana, Isshaq et al (2009) find no significant relationship between insider ownership 
and firm performance. However, their measure of insider ownership based on the managers and 
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employees shareholdings is different from managerial ownership used by prior studies. In line 
with the agency model, the fifth hypothesis is: 
 
H5. Higher managerial ownership should lead to lower agency costs  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that agency costs may be reduced by the presence of 
large ownership blockholders that have the resources and ability to monitor the actions of 
managers. Support for this active monitoring hypothesis has been found by Allen and Philips 
(2000) and Florackis and Ozkan (2009).  However, mixed results were found by Singh and 
Davidson (2003) and McKnight and Weir (2009). In Ghana, the Ghanaian Code considers 
controlling shareholders to have a responsibility to make use of their voting rights to help add 
value to their investment. This suggests that larger institutional shareholders have significant 
influence on corporate behaviour and should be responsible for reducing agency costs. 
Therefore, the sixth hypothesis is:  
 
H6. Higher levels of institutional ownership should lead to lower agency costs. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data sources 
The study covers the period from 2000 to 2009. The sample consists of all Ghanaian 
firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE). The minimum number of years of data is 2 
years with a maximum of 10 years. A panel dataset was constructed using 283 firm-year 
observations from a total of firms ranging from 21 in 2000 to 35 as at the end of 2009. The data 
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used in this study are taken from two sources, firms’ annual reports and the GSE Factbooks 2005 
and 2010. Firms’ annual reports provide the governance information on board structure, board 
committees and board size. The reports are also the source of information on managerial 
ownership and institutional ownership. Accounting data on assets, sales, debt, selling, general 
and administration expenses were gathered from the GSE Factbooks 2005 and 2010. 
 
3.2 Empirical design 
Given our interest in analysing the impact of governance and ownership structures that 
vary over time on agency costs, we employ a panel data regression analysis which provides a 
means of controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity over the sample period. The Hausman 
(1978) test is used to differentiate between random and fixed effects regression models. This 
approach allows us to test the hypothesis of no correlation between the independent variables and 
the individual firm-specific effects. If there is no correlation, a random-effects model is 
appropriate but if correlation exists, a fixed-effects model is more appropriate. Using SPAR and 
OPETSR as agency cost measures in equation 1, the Hausman test gave 
2
 of 62.11 and 56.25 (p-
value = 0.000 and 0.000), respectively, rejecting the hypothesis of no correlation. We therefore 
use the following general form of fixed effects regression in the analysis:  
 
where ACit is agency costs;  is the overall intercept;  refers to specific 
governance mechanisms, j, for firm i in year t;  is the ownership type j, for firm i 
in time t;  is a set of firm specific control variables, k, for firm i in year t; where k = 1 
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to m;  is a vector of 9 dummy variables representing the 10 sample years; and  is the 
unobserved error component. 
In addition, the agency cost-governance relationship may suffer from endogeneity (Coles 
et al, 2008; Linck et al, 2008, McKnight and Weir 2009). Thus for example, the extent of agency 
costs may determine governance structures rather than governance structures determining agency 
costs. To address this problem we use lagged values of the governance variables as instruments 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Himmelberg et al, 1999; Coles et al, 2008; Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010).  
Dependent variables 
We measure agency costs in two ways. First, consistent with Singh and Davidson (2003) 
and McKnight and Weir (2009), we use the annual sales-to-total assets ratio (STAR). This 
measures the efficiency with which assets are utlised because a high ratio value suggests a given 
value of assets are being used efficiently to generate sales. STAR is therefore an inverse proxy for 
agency costs because a high value indicates low agency costs. In contrast, a low value indicates 
that assets are being used on projects that generate low sales values and therefore suggests high 
agency costs and a misalignment of interests.  
However, caution should be exercised when using the sales-to-assets ratio as a measure 
of agency costs. For example, it has been criticised on the grounds of differences in the 
accounting policies used in the measurement of assets (Ang et al, 2000). In addition, McKnight 
and Weir (2009) argue that higher sales may not increase shareholder wealth because they may 
come from wealth-destroying activities. Notwithstanding these issues, consistent with Ang et al 
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(2000), Singh and Davidson (2003) and McKnight and Weir (2009), we argue that the sales-to-
assets ratio is a useful indicator of agency costs. 
The second measure of agency costs is the expenses-to-sales ratio which indicates the 
extent to which discretionary expenses are incurred in the generation of sales. As in Ang et al 
(2000), Singh and Davidson (2003) and Florackis and Ozkan (2009), we measure agency costs in 
terms of the operating expenses-to-sales ratio (OPETSR). Operating expenses are defined as total 
expenses less cost of goods sold, interest expense and managerial compensation (Ang et al, 
2000). This measures how successful managers are at controlling operating costs, something 
which includes perks. A high ratio indicates that managers are unable to control operating 
expenses and therefore shows high agency costs 
Independent Variable 
(i) Governance variables  
BODSIZE is a firm’s total number of board members. DUALITY is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the roles of the CEO and the Chairman of the board are combined and 0 
otherwise. NX is the percentage of non-executive directors on the total board. AUDCOM is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has an audit committee and 0 otherwise. 
REMCOM is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has a remuneration committee 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
(ii) Ownership variables 
Managerial ownership (MGROWN) is the percentage of shares held by executive directors. 
Blockholding is measured by institutional ownership (INSTITSH) which is the total percentage of 
shares held by institutional shareholders in excess of 3% of the total shareholding.  
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(iii) Control variables 
  We control for firm size (SIZE) and debt levels (DEBT) in our regression models for the 
following reasons. Firm size is likely to affect agency costs due to the differences in asset 
utilisation (Singh and Davidson, 2003). In addition, larger and complex firms present greater 
informational difficulties for shareholders (Doukas et al, 2000). SIZE is defined as the natural log 
of annual sales. Similarly, firms with the higher levels of debt are more closely monitored by 
debt-holders and thus managers have less chance to undertake non-value maximising projects 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A firm’s debt, DEBT, is measured by the ratio of total debt to total 
assets.  
 
Based on our hypotheses, Table 1 sets out the predicted signs for each of the tested governance 
and ownership structure variables. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
  
4. Empirical results    
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the whole period from 2000 to 2009. The 
average sales-to-assets agency cost measure is 1.4186 and the operating expense-to-sales ratio’s 
average was 0.9187. Average managerial ownership is 8.59% and the average total institutional 
ownership for those with at least a 3% holding is 72.96%. The average board size is 8.52. Some 
16% of the Ghanaian listed firms combined the posts of CEO and chairman with non-executive 
directors making up an average of 75.80% of boards. Only 28% of firms have a remuneration 
committee but 70% have an audit committee.  
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
To assess the effect of the introduction of the Ghanaian Code on share ownership and on 
the adoption of the recommended individual governance mechanisms, Table 3 compares the 
mean ownership and the individual governance mechanisms during the pre-and post-code sub-
periods. As Table 3 shows, there was a significant increase in the managerial ownership during 
the post-code period from 3.35% to 10.5%. Similarly, institutional ownership experienced a 
significant increase in the post-code period from 45.33% to 74.03%. Board size experienced a 
significant decrease in the post-code period from 9.03 to 8.17, suggesting that the Ghanaian 
boards became smaller after the introduction of the Ghanaian Code. Although there has been a 
fall in duality, it is not significant. Similarly, there has been an increase in the proportion of non-
executive directors, but the change is not significant.  However, there have been significant 
increases in the adoption of both audit and remuneration committees. These results therefore 
show that ownership and certain governance mechanisms experienced significant changes after 
the introduction of the Ghanaian Code.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix to help determine whether there is high 
collinearity between the variables included in the analysis. No evidence of multicollinearity was 
found.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
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Models 1 and 2  of Table 5 presents the fixed effects regression results for the impact of 
individual governance and ownership variables on agency costs during the whole study period 
from 2000 to 2009 whilst models 3 and 4 include non-board structure variables.  Following 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010), we use lagged values of the governance variables to address the 
endogeneity problem and therefore the number in our sample is reduced from 283 to 244. 
Consistent with hypothesis 1, Model 1 shows that board size is positively and significantly 
related to the sales-to-assets ratio. This suggests that smaller boards reduce agency costs relative 
to larger board sizes. In contrast to hypotheses 2 and 3, we find no evidence to suggest that either 
duality or the proportion of non-executive directors affects agency costs.  
However, and consistent with hypothesis 4, there is evidence that the presence of audit 
and remuneration committees reduces agency costs measured by sales-assets-ratio. This suggests 
that both types of committees are operating as expected during the period under consideration. 
Therefore it would appear that audit committees are fulfilling their monitoring and advisory roles 
effectively. In addition, the results suggest that remuneration committees may have been 
operating as anticipated and that the executive directors pay awards have been successful in 
realigning the interests of management and shareholders. Consistent with hypothesis 5, model 1 
shows that higher managerial ownership reduces agency costs. We also find evidence to support 
hypothesis 6, that higher institutional ownership reduces agency costs. However, as model 2 
shows, none of the board variables were significant in explaining the expenses-to-sales ratio 
measure of agency costs. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE    
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 The above analysis covers the whole study period from 2000 to 2009. We therefore 
develop the analyses further by evaluating the effect of the Ghanaian Code’s introduction on 
agency costs. Consistent with the agency model, if the recommendations represent good 
governance, and given the increase in the overall compliance with the Ghanaian Code from pre-
2003 to post-2003 (Owusu and Weir, 2016), we would expect the introduction of the code to 
result in lower agency costs, assuming that the pre-code governance structures were not 
effective. To test this we construct a variable, CODE, which takes the value of 1 in each of the 
years following the introduction of the code and 0 for each of the years preceding it. CODE 
therefore measures the effect of the adoption of a wide range of governance recommendations on 
agency costs. 
First, we find that agency costs fell significantly after the introduction of the code. The 
sales-to-assets ratio rose from 0.9834 pre-code to 1.8521 post-code, and the expense-to-sales 
ratio fell from 1.2641 to 0.6329, both differences being statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Models 1 and 2 of Table 6 report the results of the code change, whilst models 3 and 4 include 
the non-board structure variables. As Table 6 shows, CODE is statistically significant for both 
agency cost measures which suggests that the introduction of the Ghanaian Code is associated 
with lower agency costs. The results therefore suggest that the Code has improved the standard 
and effectiveness of corporate governance in Ghana. Both managerial and institutional 
ownership remain significant for the sales-to-assets measure of agency costs but remain 
insignificant in model 2 for the expenses-to-sales measure of agency costs. These results 
therefore suggest that ownership is a substitute for the governance mechanisms recommended in 
the Ghanaian code. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
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Given the significant impact of the introduction of the Ghanaian code, we further develop 
the analysis by undertaking regressions for each of the two sub-periods: before the Ghanaian 
Code was introduce (pre-2003) and after the Ghanaian Code was introduced (post-2003). If pre-
code governance structures are considered ineffective, we would expect the governance 
relationships to be associated with higher agency costs during the pre-Code sub-period, whereas 
the agency model would predict that the structures recommended by the Ghanaian Code should 
lead to a reduction in agency costs. 
Table 7 presents the results for both sub-periods where models 1, 2, 5 and 6 represent the 
pre-code and the post-code sub-periods of the ownership structure, individual governance 
mechanisms and agency costs relationship, whilst models 3, 4, 7 and 8 include the non-board 
structure variables. Unlike our earlier findings, smaller board sizes are found to significantly 
reduce both agency cost measures post-2003, suggesting that the average board size of 8.17 is 
more effective in reducing agency costs. We also find that, for both sub-periods, duality and the 
proportion of non-executive directors are insignificant, implying that the changes to duality and 
the proportion of non-executive directors representation brought about by the Ghanaian Code’s 
introduction had no effect on agency costs. However, there is evidence that the introduction of 
audit and remuneration committees has reduced agency costs, a finding consistent with the 
agency model. Increased managerial and institutional ownership are also found to reduce agency 
costs, a finding also consistent with the agency model.  
Given that we have found that agency costs are significantly lower since the introduction 
of the Ghanaian corporate governance code but that not all of the board structure variables seem 
to reduce agency costs, we develop the analysis to investigate the effect of non-board structure 
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variables recommended by the Ghanaian Code, with the results being reported in models 3, 4 7 
and 8. Three variables are introduced: shareholder activism measured by voting by mail (VBM), 
audit quality measured by the type of audit firm used by a particular firm (AUDITOR) and 
improvement in financial reporting to shareholders measured by the adoption of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (AIFRS).  
The code recommends that firms provide shareholders with the opportunity to vote by 
mail, something which was not present before the code’s introduction. This change represents a 
move towards more shareholder activism because shareholders now had more opportunity to 
influence decisions made at the annual general meetings (AGMs). VBM is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 if shareholders are able to vote by mail and 0 if not.  Before the code’s 
introduction, all firms allowed proxy voting and the approval of directors' re-election. The 
importance of VBM is that it gives extra power to shareholders to participate in the decision-
making process, something which should lead to a reduction in agency costs.  
The Ghanaian code identifies auditor quality as a key factor in the improvement of 
financial monitoring. AUDITOR is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the company 
is audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms and 0 if not. This may be regarded as a measure of 
audit quality and should reduce agency costs.  
AIFRS is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if a firm has adopted the International 
Financial Reporting Standards and 0 if not. It therefore shows the impact on agency costs of 
firms adopting a consistent set of internationally accepted reporting standards. If firms did not 
adopt these standards, they were expected to comply with the Ghana National Accounting 
Standards and so the variable will pick up the improvement in reporting and disclosure required 
by international rather than local standards.  
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In models 3 and 4 of Table 7, we find that for the pre-code period, VBM, AUDITOR and 
AIFRS are all insignificant. However, each in models 7 and 8 of Table 7 is significant in the 
post-code period suggesting that the quality of financial monitoring and reporting improved after 
the code’s introduction. The results also confirm that NX and DUALITY remain insignificant 
but board size and the presence of audit and remuneration committees reduce agency costs. The 
results therefore offer some support for the agency model because they identify the crucial role 
played by improved monitoring in the reduction of agency costs.  
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study investigates the relationship between agency costs, ownership structure and 
corporate governance in Ghanaian listed firms. We hypothesised that the ownership structure and 
corporate governance changes prompted by the introduction of the Ghanaian Code in 2003 
should lead to lower agency costs. Using a sample of Ghanaian listed firms from 2000 to 2009 
and a panel data analytical framework, our results after controlling for endogeneity, show that 
smaller board sizes decrease agency costs. This evidence is in line with Lipton and Lorch (1992) 
who argue that a board size between eight and nine is more effective than a larger board size. We 
also find that the presence of audit and remuneration committees reduces agency costs 
suggesting that they operate in the interests of shareholders.  However, we find no evidence that 
increasing the representation of non-executive directors or reducing the incidence of duality has 
any effect on agency costs. This suggests that not all board structure governance mechanisms are 
effective in mitigating agency costs.  We also find that, the non-board structure code 
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recommendations such as improved shareholder voting rights, the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards and auditor quality have also reduced agency costs.  
The results also show that increased managerial and institutional ownership significantly 
reduces agency costs, a finding that supports Coles et al (2008) and McKnight and Weir (2009). 
This offers support for the agency model and suggests that managers’ and shareholders’ interests 
are aligned through increased ownership in Ghana. Furthermore, we find that the adoption of the 
Ghanaian Code leads to a reduction in agency costs, something that would not have been clear if 
the pre-code and the post-code periods had not been investigated separately.  
Our results have important implications for investors and policy makers. For investors, 
the adoption of a corporate governance code by their investee firms can provide a means of 
reducing agency conflicts prompted by the separation of ownership and control, hence, result in 
lower agency costs. For policy makers, firms should be encouraged to implement the applicable 
corporate governance code’s provisions if they are to protect shareholders from expropriation 
and align managers and shareholders’ interests towards value maximisation.   
One limitation of this study is that it focuses on firms listed on the Ghana Stock 
Exchange. One development would be to extend the analysis to other African countries, 
particularly those with a governance code. This will present an opportunity to investigate how far 
differences in the institutional environment explain the level and the effect of governance and 
ownership structures on agency costs.  
 
 
24 
 
References 
Allen, J.W. and Phillips, G.M., (2000) Corporate equity ownership, strategic alliances, and 
product market relationships. The Journal of Finance, 55(6), pp. 2791-2815  
Ang, J.S., Cole, R.A. and Lin, J.W., (2000) Agency costs and ownership structure. The Journal 
of Finance, 55(1), pp. 81-106  
Berle, A. and Means, G., (1932) The modern corporate and private property. McMillian, New 
York, NY 
Black, B. and Kim, W., (2012) The effect of board structure on firm value: A multiple 
identification strategies approach using Korean data. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(1), 
pp. 203-226  
Bozec, R., (2005) Boards of directors, market discipline and firm performance. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, 32(9-10), pp. 1921-1960  
Cadbury Committee (1992) Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, Gee Publishing, London. 
Chen, C.W., Lin, J.B. and Yi, B., (2008) CEO duality and firm performance–an endogenous 
issue. Corporate Ownership & Control, 6(1), pp. 58-65  
Cho, D.S. and Kim, J., (2007) Outside directors, ownership structure and firm profitability in 
Korea. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2), pp. 239-250  
Coles, J.L., Daniel, N.D. and Naveen, L., (2008) Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 87(2), pp. 329-356  
Dahya, J. and McConnell, J. J. (2007) Board composition, corporate performance, and the 
Cadbury committee recommendation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 42(03), 
535-564 
Daily, C.M. and Dalton, D.R., (1992) The relationship between governance structure and 
corporate performance in entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 7(5), pp. 375-386  
Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M., Ellstrand, A.E. and Johnson. J.L., (1998) Meta-analytic reviews of 
board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic Management 
Journal, 19(3), pp. 269-290  
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S. and Wells, M.T., (1998) Larger board size and decreasing firm value 
in small firms1. Journal of Financial Economics, 48(1), pp. 35-54  
Fan, J. P. and Wong, T. J., (2002) Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of 
accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of accounting and economics, 33(3), 401-425 
25 
 
 
Fama, E.F., (1980) Agency problems and the theory of the firm . Journal of Political Economy. 
88, pp. 288-307  
Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. (1983) Separation of ownership and control. Journal of law and 
economics, 301-325. 
Fisher, D., (2011) The world’s worst economies, Forbes magazine, 5 July. 
Fleming, G., Heaney, R. and McCosker. R., (2005) Agency costs and ownership structure in 
Australia. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 13 (1):29-52.  
Florackis, C. and Ozkan, A (2009) The impact of managerial entrenchment on agency costs: An 
empirical investigation using UK panel data. European Financial Management 15 (3):497-528. 
Guest, P.M., (2009) The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the UK. The 
European Journal of Finance, 15(4), pp. 385-404  
Gupta, M. and Fields, L.P., (2009) Board independence and corporate governance: evidence 
from director resignations. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 36(1 & 2), pp. 161-184  
Gugler, K., Mueller, D. C. and Burcin Yurtoglu, B. (2003) The Impact of Corporate Governance 
on Investment Returns in Developed and Developing Countries. The Economic Journal, 
113(491), F511-F539. 
Haniffa, R. and Hudaib, M., (2006) Corporate governance structure and performance of 
Malaysian listed companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(7‐8), pp. 1034-1062  
Hausman, J.A., (1978) Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, pp. 1251-1271  
Hermalin, B.E. and Weisbach, M.S., (1991) The effects of board composition and direct 
incentives on firm performance. Financial Management, 21, pp. 101-112  
Himmelberg, C.P., Hubbard, R.G. and Palia, D., (1999) Understanding the determinants of 
managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 53(3), pp. 353-384  
Isshaq, Z., Bokpin, G.A. and Onumah, J.M., (2009) Corporate governance, ownership structure, 
cash holdings, and firm value on the Ghana Stock Exchange. Journal of Risk Finance, 10(5), pp. 
488-499  
Jensen, M.C., (1986) Agency Costs of free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 
American Economic Review. 76, pp. 323-329  
26 
 
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H., (1976) Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), pp. 305-360  
Jiraporn, P., Singh, M. and Lee, C.I., (2009) Ineffective corporate governance: Director busyness 
and board committee memberships. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(5), pp. 819-828  
Kajola, S.O., (2008) Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: The Case of Nigerian Listed 
Firms. European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences, 14, pp. 16-28  
King Committee (1994) King report on corporate governance for South Africa, Institute of 
Directors in Southern Africa, Johannesburg. 
 
Klapper, L.F. and Love, I., (2004) Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance 
in emerging markets, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 10 No. 5, pp. 703-728. 
Klein, A., (1998) Firm performance and board committee structure. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 41(1), pp. 275-303  
Kyereboah-Coleman, A. and Biekpe, N., (2006) The relationship between board size, board 
composition, CEO duality and firm performance: experience from Ghana. Corporate Ownership 
and Control, 4(2), pp. 114-122  
Laing, D. and Weir, C.M., (1999) Governance structures, size and corporate performance in UK 
firms. Management Decision, 37(5), pp. 457-464  
Lam, T.Y. and Lee, S.K., (2012) Family ownership, board committees and firm performance: 
evidence from Hong Kong. Corporate Governance, 12(3), pp. 6-6  
Larcker, D. F. and Rusticus, T. O. (2010) On the use of instrumental variables in accounting 
research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49(3), 186-205. 
Larcker, D.F., Ormazabal, G. and Taylor, D.J., (2011) The market reaction to corporate 
governance regulation. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(2), pp. 431-448  
Linck, J., Netter, J. and Yang T. (2008) The determinants of board structure, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 87 (2), 308-328  
Lipton, M. and Lorsch, J.W., (1992) A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. 
Business Lawyer, 48, pp. 59-59  
McKnight, P.J. and Weir, C., (2009) Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and 
ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data analysis. The 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49(2), pp. 139-158  
Mustapha, M. and Che Ahmad, A., (2011) Agency theory and managerial ownership: evidence 
from Malaysia. Managerial Auditing Journal, 26(5), 419-436 
27 
 
 
Owusu, A. and Weir, C., (2013) Do company directors underestimate the adoption of corporate 
governance provisions? A survey approach. Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing, 9(11), 
pp.1526-1534 
Owusu, A. and Weir, C., (2016) The governance-performance relationship: evidence from 
Ghana. Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 17(3), 285-310 
Rabelo, F. M. and Vasconcelos, F. C., (2002) Corporate governance in Brazil. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 37(3), 321-335 
Sanda, A.U., Mikailu, A.S. and Garba, T., (2010) Corporate governance mechanisms and firms' 
financial performance in Nigeria. Afro-Asian Journal of Finance and Accounting, 2(1), pp. 22-39  
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., (1986) Large shareholders and corporate control. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 94(3), pp. 461-488  
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W., (1997) A survey of corporate governance. The journal of 
finance, 52(2), 737-783 
Singh, M. and Davidson, W.N., (2003) Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate 
governance mechanisms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(5), pp. 793-816  
Vafeas, N., (1999) The nature of board nominating committees and their role in corporate 
governance. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 26(1-2), pp. 199-225  
WANG, J., LU, G. and HE, P., (2011) Study on the Relationship Between Agency Costs and 
Governance Mechanisms: Evidence from China’s A-share Listed Companies. M & Forum, 
pp.258-271 
Weir, C., Laing, D. and McKnight, P.J., (2002) Internal and external governance mechanisms: 
their impact on the performance of large UK public companies. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 29(5‐6), pp. 579-611  
Wild, J.J., (1994) Managerial accountability to shareholders: Audit committees and the 
explanatory power of earnings for returns. The British Accounting Review, 26(4), pp. 353-374  
Wintoki, M.B., Linck, J.S. and Netter, J.M., (2012) Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal 
corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 105, pp. 581-606  
Yermack, D. (1996) Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), pp. 185-211  
28 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Predicted signs for the relationship between agency costs, ownership structure and corporate 
governance mechanisms 
 
Ownership and governance variables 
Agency cost measures 
sales-to-assets ratio (SPAR) expense-to-sales ratio (OPETSR) 
Board size + - 
Duality - + 
Non-executive directors + - 
Audit and remuneration committees + - 
Managerial ownership + - 
Large institutional shareholders + - 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of governance and ownership structure variables 
 
STAR is the sales-to-assets ratio. OPETSR is the operating expenses-to-sales ratio. MGROWN is the % shares held 
by the executive directors. INSTITSH is the total % shares held by institutions where the holding is greater than 3%. 
BODSIZE is the number of board members. DUALITY is when the CEO and the Chairman posts are occupied by 
the same person. NX is the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. AUDCOM is a dummy variable that 
has the value of 1 if a firm has an audit committee and 0 if not. REMCOM is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 
if a firm has a remuneration committee and 0 if not. DEBT is the ratio of total debt to total assets. SIZE is the log of 
sales. 
                          Mean                                       Median                       Std. Deviation 
 Mean Median Std. Deviation 
STAR 1.4186 0.8499 1.95146 
OPETSR  0.9187 0.9195 0.52440 
MGROWN % 8.59 0.10 18.549 
INSTITSH % 72.96 73.65 13.815 
BODSIZE 8.52 8.00 2.154 
DUALITY % 0.16 0.00 0.022 
NX % 75.80 80.00 13.096 
AUDCOM 0.70 1.00 0.461 
REMCOM 0.28 0.00 0.448 
DEBT % 26.95 22.29 26.089 
SIZE 6.29 6.15 1.292 
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Table 3: Differences in ownership and governance mechanisms across Ghanaian listed firms 
The t-test in column 4 is the independent-samples t-test (mean) based on pre-2003 and post-2003 introduction of the 
Ghanaian Code. The variables include MGROWN, INSTITSH, BODSIZE, DUALITY, NX and AUDCOM, 
REMCOM. The mean differences test for equality of means between pre-2003 and post-2003 agency costs, 
ownership and governance mechanisms. A mean difference with (***) and (**) indicate that the null hypothesis that 
the means are equal is rejected at 1% and 5% significant level. 
 
 
 
Pre-2003 
(2000-2002) 
Mean  
 
Post-2003 
(2004-2009) 
Mean  
 
 
t-test 
MGROWN% 
INSTITSH% 
BODSIZE 
DUALITY% 
NX% 
 
AUCOM 
 
REMCOM 
3.35 
45.33 
9.03 
17 
75 
33.60 
16.70 
10.53 
74.03 
8.17 
15 
76 
85 
32.50 
-6.526
*** 
-7.422
*** 
1.843
** 
0.316
 
-0.546 
-7.582
*** 
-3.563
*** 
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Table 4:  Correlation matrix of agency costs and all other variables  
Pearson’s correlation coefficient during the whole period. STAR is the sales-to-assets ratio. OPETSR is the operating expenses-to-sales ratio MGROWN is the % 
shares held by the executive directors. INSTITSH is the total % shares held by institutions where the holding is greater than 3%. BODSIZE is the number of 
board members. DUALITY is when the CEO and the Chairman posts are occupied by the same person. NX is the proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board. AUDCOM is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if a firm has an audit committee and 0 if not. REMCOM is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 
if a firm has a remuneration committee and 0 if not. DEBT is the ratio of total debt to total assets. SIZE is the log of sales. 
 
 STAR OPETSR MGROWN INSTITSH BODSIZE DUALITY NX AUDCOM REMCOM DEBT SIZE 
            
STAR 1.0000           
OPETSR 0.0439 1.0000           
MGROWN 0.0188 -0.0879 1.0000          
INSTITSH 0.1423 -0.2746 -0.1400 1.0000         
BODSIZE 0.0551 -0.1994 -0.3633 0.2620 1.0000        
DUALITY -0.0851 -0.0202 0.0522 0.1954 -0.3031 1.0000      
NX 0.1789 0.1489 0.0100 -0.1733 -0.1798 0.0365 1.0000      
AUDCOM 0.1263 -0.0338 -0.0121 -0.0769 0.1321 -0.2087 -0.0252 1.0000     
REMCOM 0.1317 -0.0678 -0.1529 -0.0623 0.3097 -0.2075 0.2270 0.3044  1.0000   
DEBT 0.0279 -0.0434 0.0016 0.0017 0.1388 -0.1215 0.1295 0.1877  0.2085 1.0000  
SIZE 0.0833 -0.0278 0.2127 0.0466 0.0194 0.1951 0.0340 -0.0096 -0.0155 0.1595 1.0000 
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Table 5: Fixed effects regression results for the impact of governance and ownership structure variables on 
agency costs 
 
Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 all correct for endogeneity using lagged governance variables. In Models 1 and 3, STAR 
represents sales-to-assets ratio measure of agency costs and OPETSR represents the operating expenses-to-sales 
ratio in Models 2 and 4. BODSIZE is the number of board members. DUALITY is a dummy variable that has the 
value of 1 if a firm CEO and the Chairman posts are occupied by the same person and 0 if not. NX is the proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board. AUDCOM is a dummy variable that has the value 1 if a firm has an audit 
committee and 0 if not. REMCOM is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if a firm has a remuneration 
committee and 0 if not. MGROWN is the percentage of shares held by the executive directors. INSTITSH is the 
total percentage of shares held by institutions where the holding is greater than 3%.  VBM is a dummy variable that 
has a value of 1 if a firm allows voting by mail and 0 if not. AUDITOR is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 
if a firm has a Big 4 auditor and 0 if not. AIFRS is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if a firm has adopted the 
International Financial Reporting Standards and 0 if not. DEBT is the ratio of total debt to total assets. SIZE is the 
log of sales. t-statistics are in parenthesis and coefficients are on top of parenthesis. Year dummy and firm dummy 
variables are included in the regression models but their coefficients are not reported. ***, ** and * significant at 1, 
5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
                                                Model 1                       Model 2                        Model 3                       Model 4 
 STAR OPETSR STAR OPETSR 
BODSIZE 0.071 -0.016 0.099 -0.030 
 (2.23)** (-0.76) (2.96)*** (-1.82)* 
DUALITY -0.204 -0.047 -0.389 -0.028 
 (-0.70) (-0.45) (-1.24) (-0.74) 
NX 0.008 0.005 0.070 0.092 
 (0.74) (1.54) (0.83) (0.33) 
AUDCOM 0.103 -0.083 0.169 -0.043 
 (2.61)** (-1.25) (2.84)*** (-2.39)** 
REMCOM 0.906 -0.110 0.735 -0.190 
 (3.57)*** (-1.21) (4.24)*** (-2.15)** 
MGROWN 0.121 -0.035 0.083 -0.002 
 (2.04)** (-2.22)** (2.85)*** (-3.13)*** 
INSTITSH 0.037 -0.010 0.003 -0.066 
 (2.47)** (-3.63)*** (3.22)*** (-3.67)*** 
VBM - - 0.350 -0.395 
 - - (2.46)** (-2.54)** 
AUDITOR - - 0.310 -0.171 
 - - (2.03)** (-1.73)* 
AIFRS - - 0.345 -0.111 
 - - (2.02)** (-1.05) 
DEBT 0.011 -0.001 0.007 -0.001 
 (3.22)*** (-0.67) (2.22)** (-0.61) 
SIZE 0.137 -0.011 0.221 -0.091 
 (1.97)** (-0.39) (2.75)*** (-1.83)* 
_cons 5.432 1.456 3.309 1.311 
 (3.88)** (3.84)** (2.26)** (2.44)** 
R
2
 0.39 0.31 0.20 0.26 
N 244 244 244 244 
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Table 6: Fixed effects regression results for the impact of the code change and ownership structure variables 
on agency costs 
 
In Models 1 and 3, STAR represents sales-to-assets ratio measure of agency costs and OPETSR represents the 
operating expenses-to-sales ratio in Models 2 and 4. CODE is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1for years 
after the introduction of the Ghanaian Corporate Governance Code and 0 for years before. MGROWN is the 
percentage of shares held by the executive directors. INSTITSH is the total percentage of shares held by institutions 
where the holding is greater than 3%. VBM is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a firm allows voting by mail 
and 0 if not. AUDITOR is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if a firm has a Big 4 auditor and 0 if not. AIFRS 
is a dummy variable has the value of 1 if a firm has adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards and 0 if 
not. DEBT is the ratio of total debt to total assets. SIZE is the log of sales. t-statistics are in parenthesis and 
coefficients are on top of parenthesis. Year dummy and firm dummy variables are included in the regression models 
but their coefficients are not reported. ***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
                                               Model l                         Model 2                           Model 3                       Model 4 
            STAR         OPETSR            STAR          OPETSR 
CODE 0.300 -0.101 0.212 -0.107 
 (2.56)** (-2.47)** (3.66)*** (-3.40)*** 
MGROWN 0.006 -0.003 0.075 -0.003 
 (2.31)** (-0.27) (3.21)*** (-0.25) 
INSTITSH 0.018 -0.007 0.221 -0.009 
 (2.45)** (-1.04) (2.75)*** (-2.19)** 
VBM - - 0.009 -0.001 
 - - (3.25)*** (-2.31)** 
AUDITOR - - 0.182 -0.112 
 - - (2.60)** (-2.57)** 
AIFRS - - 0.148 -0.200 
 - - (3.30)*** (-0.68) 
DEBT 0.010 -0.001 0.416 -0.122 
 (3.54)*** (-0.46) (3.32)*** (-0.64) 
SIZE 0.108 -0.107 0.413 -0.092 
 (1.72)* (-2.89)*** (3.03)*** (-1.12) 
_cons 3.705 2.061 4.158 2.095 
 (3.71)*** (3.51)*** (4.06)*** (3.42)*** 
R
2
 0.41 0.35 0.26 0.14 
N 244 244 244 244 
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Table 7: Pre 2003 and Post 2003 fixed effects regression results for the impact of governance and ownership 
structure variables on agency costs  
 
The models correct for endogeneity using lagged governance variables. In Models 1, 3, 5 and 7, STAR represents 
sales-to-assets ratio measure of agency costs and OPETSR represents the operating expenses-to-sales ratio in 
Models 2, 4, 6 and 8. MGROWN is the percentage of shares held by the executive directors. INSTITSH is the total 
percentage of shares held by institutions where the holding is greater than 3%. BODSIZE is the number of board 
members. DUALITY is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if a firm CEO and the Chairman posts are 
occupied by the same person and 0 if not. NX is the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. AUDCOM 
is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if a firm has an audit committee and 0 if not. REMCOM is a dummy 
variable that has a value of 1 if a firm has a remuneration committee and 0 if not. VBM is a dummy variable that has 
a value of 1 if a firm allows voting by mail and 0 if not. AUDITOR is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if a 
firm has a Big 4 auditor and 0 if not. AIFRS is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if a firm has adopted the 
International Financial Reporting Standards and 0 if not. DEBT is the ratio of total debt to total assets. SIZE is the 
log of sales. t-statistics are in parenthesis and coefficients are on top of parenthesis. Year dummy and firm dummy 
variables are included in the regression models but their coefficients are not reported. ***, ** and * significant at 1, 
5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
                                               Pre 2003 (2000-2002)                                  Post 2003 (2004-2009) 
                                      Model 1       Model 2       Model 3      Model 4      Model 5      Model 6               Model 7             Model 8 
                                        STAR        OPETSR        STAR       OPETSR       STAR          OPETSR                 STAR             OPETSR 
BODSIZE 0.016 -0.013 0.020 -0.061 0.067 -0.134  0.107 -0.018 
 (1.42) (-0.96) (0.10) (-1.24) (2.66)** (-1.87)**  (2.25)** (-2.10)** 
DUALITY -0.063 -0.047 -0.124 0.171 -0.415 -0.086  -0.864 -0.238 
 (-1.02) (-0.42) (-0.53) (0.45) (-0.62) (-0.61)  (-1.50) (-0.47) 
NX 0.024 0.030 0.005 0.003 0.011 0.012  0.006 0.003 
 (0.38) (0.50) (0.10) (0.20) (0.51) (0.52)  (0.44) (0.21) 
AUCOM -0.322 -0.084 -0.293 -0.238 0.301 -0.102  0.119 -0.026 
 (-1.28) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-1.12) (1.94)** (-1.28)  (2.31)** (-2.22)** 
RECOM -0.042 -0.056 0.518 0.319 0.388 -0.037  1.898 -0.194 
 (-1.13) (-1.26) (0.43) (1.07) (3.04)*** (-1.72)*  (4.46)*** (-2.51)** 
MGROWN 0.064 -0.132 -0.012 -0.006 0.024 0.058  0.133 -0.202 
 (2.05)** (-1.03) (-0.14) (-0.28) (2.11)** (0.16)  (2.01)** (-2.07)** 
INSTITSH 0.033 -0.034 0.049 0.004 0.027 -0.028  0.073 -0.083 
 (1.41) (-1.78)* (0.66) (0.22) (2.03)** (-2.40)**  (2.80)*** (-2.12)** 
VBM - - 0.130 -0.162 - -  0.154 -0.271 
 - - (0.55) (-0.28) - -  (3.23)*** (-2.46)** 
AUDITOR - - 0.118 -0.214 - -  0.273 -0.203 
 - - (0.55) (-0.81) - -  (2.25)** (-0.20) 
AIFRS - - 0.150 -0.422 - -  0.230 -0.141 
 - - (0.11) (-1.05) - -  (2.36)** (-1.94)** 
DEBT 0.016 0.008 -0.002 0.003 0.046 0.019  0.061 -0.085 
 (1.52) (0.20) (-0.15) (1.14) (2.66)** (0.91)  (2.26)** (-1.09) 
SIZE -0.008 -0.051 1.525 0.333 0.035 -0.154  0.022 -0.098 
 (-1.62) (-1.07) (0.93) (0.82) (1.25) (-0.86)  (0.24) (-1.18) 
_cons 3.822 3.757 -1.565 -1.229 3.067 1.599  -1.919 1.836 
 (3.16)*** (2.55)** (-0.91) (-0.39) (2.32)** (1.82)*  (-1.80)* (0.86) 
R2 0.36 0.21 0.15 0.24 0.46 0.31  0.27 0.35 
N 42 42 42 42 154 154  154 154 
 
